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DOES FRANCHISING CREATE VALUE? 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE OF US PUBLIC 
RESTAURANT FIRMS 
 
 
 
 
Executive Summary: 
 
It is commonly believed that the franchising method of distribution provides strategic and  
 
operational benefits to the companies that adopt it.   These benefits should result in  
 
superior financial performance as compared to that of firms that do not use franchising.   
 
Yet, the empirical evidence of the effects of franchising on financial performance is  
 
sparse and mixed.  The purpose of this paper is to further examine the empirical evidence  
 
of the impact of franchising on a firm’s financial performance by using performance  
 
metrics (Economic Value Added and Market Value Added) that are extensively used in  
 
corporate finance.  This study focuses on the US public restaurant sector.  The results  
 
provide some evidence that franchising firms create more market and economic value  
 
than do non-franchising firms.    
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DOES FRANCHISING CREATE VALUE? 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE OF US PUBLIC 
RESTAURANT FIRMS 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Franchising has grown so fast since the 1950s that it is now pervasive in the US  
 
economy.  In a recent study commissioned by the International Franchise Association,  
 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers estimated that in 2001 there were more than 767,000 business  
 
establishments in the United States engaged in franchising, providing directly or  
 
indirectly more than 18 million jobs, over $506 billion in payroll, and over $1.5 trillion of  
 
output (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2004).  Franchising now dominates certain sectors of  
 
the US economy.  For example, over 56 percent of quick service restaurants are  
 
franchises (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2004).  Franchising is also one of the fastest  
 
growing US exports (House Committee on Small Business, 1990), and it is now  
 
estimated that franchising (in terms of number of franchised units) will grow 12 to 14  
 
percent per year in the future (Justis and Judd, 2003).   
 
The US Department of Commerce has defined franchising as follows: “Franchising is a  
 
method of doing business by which a franchisee is granted the right to engage in offering,  
 
selling, or distributing goods or services under a marketing format which is designed by  
 
the franchisor.  The franchisor permits the franchisee to use the franchisor’s trademark,  
 
name, and advertising” (Kostecka, 1987, p. 2).  Franchising has evolved over time and  
 
we can now distinguish two broad categories of franchising: product distribution  
 
franchising and business format franchising.  Business format franchising consists of a  
 
continuing commercial relationship between a firm with a proven business system (the  
 
franchisor) and a third party (the franchisee), whereby the franchisor grants rights to the  
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franchisee for a given period of time to operate their business system using a common  
 
brand and common format for promoting, managing, and administering this business.  
 
Examples of business format franchising are quick service restaurants (McDonalds,  
 
Burger King) and lodging (Marriott, Hilton).  Product distribution franchising, on the  
 
other hand, is a more limited business relationship, whereby the franchisor grants the  
 
franchisee the right to use its trademark, but may not provide her/him with a system of  
 
running its business.  Examples are automobile dealerships (Ford, Pontiac), and gas  
 
stations (Texaco, Shell).  Business format franchising is now much more prevalent than  
 
product distribution franchising, with about 4.3 times as many establishments, and  
 
providing 4 times as many jobs in 2001 (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2004).  
 
Given the success and popularity of franchising, it may seem evident that franchising  
 
helps firms achieve superior financial performance.  The object of this paper is to  
 
investigate this proposition.  First, the dominant theories explaining the motivation of  
 
firms to franchise (resource scarcity theory and agency theory) are summarized and their  
 
implications for financial performance assessed.  Then the empirical studies addressing  
 
the financial performance of franchising firms are reviewed.  Despite the undeniable  
 
popularity of franchising, there is surprisingly little empirical evidence that franchising  
 
delivers superior financial performance.  Perhaps even more surprising, there are very  
 
few studies that have tried to assess the value that franchising brings to a firm.    
 
 
 
In this paper we empirically investigate the hypothesis that franchising enhances a firm’s  
 
financial performance through superior value creation.  Building on previous studies, we  
 
propose a focused methodology and two measures of value creation that are extensively  
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used in corporate finance.  Based on four sets of indicators, we find some evidence that  
 
franchising systems create significantly more value in the US restaurant industry than  
 
non-franchising systems. 
 
 
 
 
WHY FRANCHISE? 
 
The rapid growth of franchising has attracted the interest of academic researchers with  
 
close to 100 articles in a variety of academic fields (economics, finance, management,  
 
marketing,…) having been published on this topic by the mid-1990s (Elango and Fried,  
 
1997).  Dozens more have been published since then.  Of particular interest is the  
 
motivation for firms to franchise rather than to expand through company-owned units.  
 
The two dominant theories that explain the motivation for franchising are agency theory  
 
and resource scarcity theory.  Given the purpose of this paper, it is useful to review these  
 
theories and their implications for franchisor performance. 
 
 
 
Agency theory 
 
A number of studies have explained the existence of franchising through agency theory  
 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983; Matheson and Winter, 1985; Brickley and Dark, 1987;  
 
Lafontaine, 1992).  An agency relationship exists whenever one party (the principal) hires  
 
an individual or an organization (the agent) to provide a service, and delegates decision- 
 
making authority to that agent.   
 
 
 
Because the agent’s and the principal’s self-interests may not coincide, the potential for a  
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conflict of interests exists.  The agent may not always act in the principal’s best interests  
 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989).  For example, potential shirking by the  
 
agent is a widely discussed problem in the franchise literature (Rubin, 1978; Brickley and  
 
Dark, 1987).  A salaried manager may not always put forth his/her best effort and  
 
therefore may produce sub-optimal performance.  In order to reduce this moral hazard, a  
 
non-franchised firm may need to institute a costly monitoring system.  Franchising, on 
 
the other hand, addresses this problem by providing powerful incentives for the owner- 
 
manager of the franchised unit to perform well. For example, the owner-manager (i.e., the  
 
franchisee) has a direct claim to the residual profits of her/his unit.  Also, because the  
 
franchisee has put her/his own capital at risk she/he has a powerful incentive to make  
 
her/his franchised unit successful (Brickley and Dark, 1987).  Because franchising aligns  
 
the interests of the two parties (the franchisor and the franchisee), there is less need for  
 
monitoring and a greater probability for maximum performance by the franchisee  
 
(Bradach, 1997).  There is evidence that increased managerial ownership did improve  
 
firm performance (Bruton, Keels and Scifres, 2002).  Better performance by the  
 
franchisees should translate into improved performance by the franchisor, as the  
 
franchisor’s performance depends to a large extent on its franchisees’ performance.   
 
 
 
Resource scarcity theory: 
 
An alternative theory explains franchising as a solution to the capital, managerial and  
 
informational constraints faced by expanding firms (Oxenfeldt and Kelly, 1968;  Caves  
 
and Murphy, 1976; Norton, 1988;  Carney and Gedajlovic, 1991; Shane, 1996).  This  
 
theory argues that expanding firms use franchising to get access to scarce capital (the  
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franchisee’s capital) in a cost effective way.  John Y. Brown, the former president of  
 
Kentucky Fried Chicken, estimated that it would have cost KFC $450 million to establish  
 
its first 2,700 stores, an amount of capital that was not available to KCF in the early  
 
stages of its expansion (Tikoo, 1996). 
 
 
 
A young expanding firm has two options to secure the capital it needs:  sell equity or sell  
 
franchises.  A third option, selling debt, may not be a possibility in the early stages of a  
 
firm’s existence as it may lack collateral and a proven track record.  Selling franchises  
 
may therefore be the more cost effective and realistic option (Dant, Kaufmann, 2003).  
 
Furthermore, franchisees may be able to provide capital to the franchisor at a lower cost  
 
than passive investors can (Combs and Kitchen, 1999a).  In addition to capital,  
 
franchising also provides an efficient way to obtain the managerial expertise needed to  
 
grow the business.  Because a franchisee puts a significant amount of her/his assets and  
 
time into her/his unit, she/he is likely to purchase a franchise only if she/he is confident in  
 
her/his managerial abilities (Shane, 1996).  Thus franchising addresses the adverse  
 
selection problem of firms hiring managers who may overstate their qualifications to  
 
secure employment.  Franchising also allows a firm to leverage the local market  
 
knowledge of its franchisees as it expands into new geographic areas (Minkler, 1990). 
 
 
 
Low cost capital, motivated managerial expertise, and better local market knowledge are  
 
three key resources that should reduce a franchisor’s overall risk and have a significant  
 
positive impact on a franchisor’s financial performance.  
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FRANCHISING PERFORMANCE 
 
The real value of franchising to a firm is the improvement in business performance due to  
 
its choice of growing through franchising instead of growing through its own means.   
 
Despite the large body of literature on franchising, only a handful of studies have  
 
addressed the effects of franchising on a firm’s performance.  The evidence presented by  
 
the few studies that have addressed this issue is mixed. 
 
 
 
Leleux, Spinelli, and Birley (2003) contrasted the financial performance of the US public  
 
franchisors to the Standard and Poors 500 index performance.  They concluded that the  
 
US public franchisors outperformed the S&P 500 (higher cumulative shareholder returns  
 
at similar average risk levels) for nine of the ten years of their study.  Michael (2002)  
 
found that franchising helped firms gain market share and, consequently, improved their  
 
financial performance.  Using return on equity (ROE) as their performance metric and   
 
narrowing the scope of their study, Alon, Drtina, and Gilbert (2004) examined the  
 
financial performance of franchising versus non-franchising firms in the restaurant sector  
 
over a one-year period.  They concluded that franchising did not provide any sustainable  
 
profit benefit for franchised firms in the restaurant sector.   Finally, Combs and Ketchen  
 
(1999b) could not find a linear relationship between franchising and performance.  
 
 
 
In this study we examine the effects of franchising on a firm’s financial performance by  
 
developing a methodology that takes into account the recommendations for improvement  
 
of the previous studies, and by using new performance metrics recently developed and  
 
employed in corporate finance.  We improve on previous studies in the following three  
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aspects: 
 
 
 
1.  Use ten years of data (1993-2002).  A one-year performance measurement may not be  
 
representative of the true performance of a firm, as a firm may have a stellar performance  
 
one year and awful results another year (Collins, 2001).  The results obtained may depend  
 
highly on what year was chosen for the analysis.  In addition, one period accounting  
 
numbers (earnings, “one-time” charges, inventories, etc.) are notoriously subject to  
 
manipulation (BusinessWeek, October 4, 2004).  A ten-year average smoothes the  
 
influence of transitory events, and provides a metric that is much closer to the true  
 
performance of the firm.  Alon, et al. (2004) suggest the use of multi-year data to further  
 
study the impact of franchising on profitability.   
 
 
 
2.  Focus on a homogeneous and important segment of the franchising universe.  Because  
 
different franchising industries have different characteristics, Dant et al. (1996), Elango  
 
and Fried (1997), Alon (1999), and Alon et al. (2004) have suggested that studies focus  
 
on particular industries.  Dant and Kaufmann (2003) have suggested that a focus on a  
 
single sector may enhance the “internal validity of the investigation.”  We focus on the  
 
restaurant sector because franchising is very important in this sector, and this sector is  
 
one of the few franchising industries with enough public firms to provide a meaningful  
 
sample for empirical analysis. 
 
 
 
3.  Use improved performance metrics. A major problem with traditional financial  
 
performance metrics such as return on equity (ROE) and return on assets (ROA) is that  
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they lack a formal link to shareholder value.  They do not explicitly take into account  
 
risk, and they do not reflect the opportunity cost of the capital used.  The metrics we  
 
propose, economic value added (EVA) and market value added (MVA), address these  
 
shortcomings.   
 
 
 
In corporate finance, it is assumed that management’s primary responsibility is to  
 
maximize shareholder value (Brigham and Houston, 2004).   It is generally recognized  
 
that potential agency problems exist in public firms (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).   
 
However, managers can be motivated to act in the shareholders’ best interests through  
 
incentives that reward good performance and punish poor performance.  These incentives  
 
may include, for example, managerial compensation that is tied to shareholder value,  
 
direct intervention by shareholders, the threat of firing or the threat of hostile takeover.   
 
According to OECD’s Business Sector Advisory Group on Corporate Governance, in  
 
most industrialized societies, “the generation of long-term economic profit to enhance  
 
shareholder value” is recognized as the corporation’s primary objective (OECD, 1998).    
 
Shareholder value depends on return, risk, and the amount of capital invested.  As we  
 
mentioned above, a major problem with ROE and other traditional financial performance  
 
metrics is that they may not be consistent with shareholder value maximization.  On the  
 
other hand, EVA and MVA are consistent with shareholder value maximization. Over the  
 
past decade, EVA and MVA have become very popular with US corporations. 
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Economic Value Added (EVA)  
 
EVA is a value-based performance metric tool used to compute the true economic profit  
 
of a firm, as opposed to its accounting profit (such as net income). EVA is not a new  
 
concept.  In fact, the concept of economic profit goes back to at least 1890 when Alfred  
 
Marshall wrote: “What remains of his [the owner or manager’s] profits after deducting  
 
interest on his capital at the current rate may be called his earnings of undertaking or  
 
management.” (Marshall, 1890)  Thus, the value created by a firm (the economic profit)  
 
must reflect not only its accounting expenses, but also the opportunity cost of the capital  
 
used.   
 
 
 
EVA is computed as follows: 
 
 
EVA = NOPAT – (Invested Capital x Weighted Average Cost of Capital) 
 
Where: 
 
 NOPAT (Net Operating Profit After Tax ) = Net Sales – Operating Expenses – Taxes 
 
 Invested Capital = Debt + Preferred Stock + Common Equity 
 
 
 
When EVA is positive, then management has created value.  When EVA is negative, then  
 
management has destroyed value.  To maximize shareholder value, managers need to  
 
maximize EVA. 
 
 
 
EVA was pioneered by the consulting firm Stern Stewart & Co (Stewart, 1991; Stewart,  
 
1994; Stern Stewart 1994).  It has become a leading concept in corporate finance and a  
 
popular tool among chief financial officers since the 1990s.  Stern Stewart claims to have  
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worked with over 300 companies to help them become “EVA companies.”  Among these  
 
companies are Coca Cola, Eli Lilly, Sprint, US Postal Service, Germany’s Siemens, and  
 
Australia’s Telstra. (Stern Stewart web site, October 2004).   
 
 
 
In addition to being a performance measurement tool, EVA has also been used for setting  
 
organizational targets, compensation plans, capital budgeting goals, and corporate  
 
valuation.  In fact, one of the most important uses of EVA is to align management and  
 
shareholder interests by tying executive compensation to shareholder value created  
 
(Birchard, 1994; Stern, Stewart, and Chew, 1995; Blair, 1997; Wallace, 1997; Ehrbar,  
 
1999; Dodd and Johns, 1999; Baum, Sarver, and Strickland, 2004).  EVA, thus, directly  
 
addresses the two factors motivating franchising:  agency problem and capital scarcity. 
 
 
 
Market Value Added (MVA) 
 
MVA measures the market value that a firm has created.  MVA is an extension of EVA  
 
in that MVA is equal to the present value of the future streams of EVAs.  MVA compares  
 
the value of what shareholders put into the firm and what it is currently worth.  When the  
 
value of management’s actions and investments is more than the value of the capital  
 
contributed to the firm by shareholders, then MVA is positive and value has been created.   
 
When the reverse is true, then MVA is negative and value has been destroyed.  To  
 
maximize shareholder value, management needs to maximize MVA.  
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MVA is computed as follows: 
 
 
MVA = Market Value – Common Equity 
 
Where: 
 
 Market Value = Stock price x Shares outstanding 
 
 
 
 
MVA has recently acquired more importance as EVA has come under attack for, among  
 
other things, a lack of conclusive empirical support of the relationship between  
 
shareholder value and a firm’s EVA (Biddle, Bowen, and Wallace, 1997; Chen and  
 
Dodd, 1997; Chen and Dodd, 2001).  CFO magazine now publishes a yearly ranking of  
 
US public corporations by MVA (GE, Microsoft, and Wal-Mart were, not surprisingly,  
 
the top 3 in 2002. McDonald’s at number 75 and Cendant Corp. at number 140 were the  
 
top franchising firms (CFO Magazine, July 1, 2003)).  
 
 
 
 
 
DATA AND RESULTS 
 
In order to determine which restaurant firms would be included in the current study,  
 
stock, income statement and balance sheet data were obtained from Standard and  
 
Poors’ COMPUSTAT database for the 10-year period 1993-2002.  The study sample  
 
was arrived at through a process of elimination using several filters.  Only food services  
 
firms were included (NAICS=7221 -  “Full Service Restaurants,” and NAICS=7222 -   
 
“Limited Service Eating Places”).  In 2002, there were 81 such firms in the  
 
COMPUSTAT database.  Firms with less than ten years of data (1993 to 2002) were  
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dropped.  Forty six firms were left in the data sample.  These firms were then divided into  
 
two categories: franchisors and non-franchisors.  The determination of the franchising  
 
status of the firms was based on data from the International Franchise Association and  
 
Entrepreneur Magazine.  Following Alon et al. (2004), four firms were dropped from the  
 
sample as they had absolute values of ROE in excess of 50 percent.  Also, in order to  
 
avoid biased results, McDonald’s, the largest firm in the sample, was dropped as its  
 
MVA and EVA numbers were far greater than those of any other firm in the sample  
 
(McDonald’s had an average MVA of $24.4 billion while the next highest firm had an  
 
MVA of $1.4 billion).  Forty one firms were left in the sample:  24 franchisors and 17  
 
non-franchisors (see Appendix A). 
 
 
 
MVA and EVA were then computed for each of these companies, and ten year averages  
 
were obtained.  95.8% of the franchisors created market value vs. 88.2% of the non- 
 
franchisors (see Table 1).  Also, 62.5% of the franchisors created economic value vs.  
 
58.8% of the non-franchisors (see Table 2). 
 
 
 
Table 1.  Market Value Creation 
 
 FRANCHISORS 
(N = 24) 
NON-FRANCHISORS 
(N = 17) 
# Companies that created 
Market Value (MVA > 0) 
23 15 
# Companies that destroyed 
Market Value (MVA < 0) 
1 2 
Percentage of companies 
that created Market Value 
95.8% 88.2% 
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Table 2.  Economic Value Creation 
 
 FRANCHISORS 
(N = 24) 
NON-FRANCHISORS 
(N = 17) 
# Companies that created 
Economic Value (EVA > 0) 
15 10 
# Companies that destroyed 
Economic Value (MVA < 0) 
9 7 
Percentage of companies that 
created Economic Value 
62.5% 58.8% 
 
 
 
Average ROE and total shareholder return (computed as share price x number of shares  
 
outstanding + total dividends) were then computed for comparison purposes.  Descriptive  
 
statistics are shown for the franchisors (Table 3) and for the non-franchisors (Table 4).   
 
The MVA mean is $363.4M (S.D.=$464.5M) for the franchisors,  and $144.3M  
 
(S.D.=$220.5M) for the non-franchisors.  The EVA means is $13.3M (S.D.=$24.5M) for  
 
the franchisors, and $3.2M (S.D.=$13.3M) for the non-franchisors.  On average, a  
 
franchisor created $363.4M in market value and $13.3M in economic value, while a non- 
 
franchisor created $144.3M in market value and $3.2M in economic value.   Also, on  
 
average, franchisors had shareholder returns (SR) of 4.2 percent versus 0.6 percent for  
 
non-franchisors. 
 
 
 
Table 3.  Descriptive Statistics - Franchisors 
 
N = 24 MVA EVA Shareholder 
Returns 
ROE 
Mean $363.4M 
 
$13.3M 4.2% 4.1% 
Standard 
Deviation 
$464.5M $24.5M 10.9% 13.9% 
Range -$5.9M  
$1,409.1M 
 
-$23.0  
$72.1M 
-18.8%  
28.0% 
-28.5%  
18.3% 
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Table 4.  Descriptive Statistics – Non-Franchisors 
 
N= 17 MVA EVA Shareholder 
Returns 
ROE 
Mean $144.3M 
 
$3.2M 0.6% 4.6% 
Standard 
Deviation 
$220.5M $13.3M 15.9% 16.9% 
Range -$3.4M  $766.2M 
 
-$22.0  
$25.3M 
-20.1%  
28.3% 
-32.8%  
41.2% 
 
 
 
Table 5 shows the correlation matrix.  Both MVA and EVA show some correlation with  
 
the Franchise variable (0.277 and 0.247, respectively).  Confirming Alon et al. (2004)  
 
results, the ROE has a very low correlation with the Franchise variable (-0.016).  As  
 
expected, EVA and MVA are highly correlated (0.886).  Also, ROE is correlated with  
 
EVA (0.525).  This is to be expected.  To see this, we can rewrite EVA as follows: 
 
 
 
 EVA = (Equity capital) x (ROE – Cost of equity capital) 
 
 
 
ROE, then, is a determinant of EVA.  The other determinants are risk (as reflected by the 
cost of capital) and the amount of equity capital used.   
 
 
Table 5.  Correlation Matrix 
 
 Franchise MVA EVA SR ROE 
Franchise 1.000     
MVA 0.277 1.000    
EVA 0.247 0.886 1.000   
SR 0.137 0.297 0.311 1.000  
ROE -0.016 0.376 0.525 0.582 1.000 
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To further determine that performance differed between franchisors and non-franchisors,  
 
we ran tests for equality of means.  These are t-tests on the difference between the  
 
variable means of the franchisors and the non-franchisors.  Table 6 displays the results.   
 
For ROE and shareholder returns, the p-values are 0.92 and 0.39 respectively, clearly  
 
showing that the differences in the means of these variables for franchisors and non- 
 
franchisors are not significant.  For MVA and EVA, the p-values are 0.08 and 0.12  
 
respectively, much lower than for ROE and shareholder returns.  However, at a 5 percent  
 
cut-off level, the means differences are not significant.   
 
 
 
Table 6.  Tests of Equality of Means 
 
Performance Metric Mean 
Difference 
t-value p-value 
MVA $219.1M 1.801 0.079 
EVA $10.1M 1.591 0.118 
ROE -0.49% 0.102 0.919 
Shareholder Returns 3.6% 0.862 0.394 
     
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE 
RESEARCH 
 
 
The dominant theories explaining the franchising phenomenon imply that firms choosing  
 
to expand through franchising may have significant advantages over firms that grow  
 
through their own means.  Franchising firms minimize agency problems, and have access  
 
to cheaper capital, motivated managerial expertise, and better local market knowledge.    
 
It can then be hypothesized that these advantages should translate into superior financial  
 
performance for the franchising firms.  This study has provided some support for this  
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hypothesis.  It has uncovered some evidence that over the ten year period 1993-2002,  
 
US public restaurant franchisors have created more value than their non-franchising  
 
competitors: 
 
 
1.  Franchisors have a slightly higher propensity to create market value and economic  
 
 value than non-franchisors; 
 
2.  Franchisors generate on average higher MVA and EVA than do non-franchisors; and 
 
3.  There is some correlation between Franchising and MVA and EVA.  
 
 
 
This study has a number of limitations.  First, the firms included in this study are all  
 
mature, well established firms, with at least ten years of existence as publicly traded  
 
companies.  For these firms, the advantages that franchising brings are not as critical as  
 
for new, expanding firms.  For example, for most of these firms, access to capital is not a  
 
serious problem. The results of this study may lead one to speculate that new, fast  
 
growing franchising firms may create more (possibly significantly more) value than non- 
 
franchising firms at the same stage of growth.   This would be an interesting hypothesis  
 
to investigate.    
 
 
 
Second, for the reasons explained earlier, this study had a narrow focus on the US  
 
restaurant sector.  Studies focusing on other sectors of the economy and on other  
 
countries could provide additional evidence on the value creation performance of  
 
franchising.  
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Finally, because the focus of this study was very narrow, the sample size was small (41  
 
firms).  Expanding the sector under investigation will increase the sample size, and may  
 
lead to more robust results. 
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APPENDIX A   
 
FRANCHISORS  
   
 SYMBOL COMPANY NAME 
1 APPB APPLEBEES INTL INC 
2 BNHNA BENIHANA INC  -CL A 
3 BYBI BACK YARD BURGERS INC 
4 CEC CEC ENTERTAINMENT INC 
5 CHKR CHECKERS DRIVE-IN RESTAURANT 
6 CKR CKE RESTAURANTS INC 
7 DRI DARDEN RESTAURANTS INC 
8 EAT BRINKER INTL INC 
9 FRS FRISCH'S RESTAURANTS INC 
10 GRIL GRILL CONCEPTS INC 
11 GTIM GOOD TIMES RESTAURANTS INC 
12 JBX JACK IN THE BOX INC 
13 MAIN MAIN STREET RESTAURANT GROUP 
14 MAXE MAX & ERMAS RESTAURANTS 
15 NATH NATHANS FAMOUS INC 
16 OSI OUTBACK STEAKHOUSE INC 
17 PNRA PANERA BREAD CO 
18 PZZA PAPA JOHNS INTERNATIONAL INC 
19 RARE RARE HOSPITALITY INTL INC 
20 RI RUBY TUESDAY INC 
21 RYAN RYAN'S RESTAURANT GROUP INC 
22 SONC SONIC CORP 
23 SZ WORLDWIDE RESTAURANT CONCEPT 
24 WEN WENDY'S INTERNATIONAL INC 
 
NON-FRANCHISORS 
   
 SYMBOL COMPANY NAME 
1 ARKR ARK RESTAURANTS CORP 
2 BOBE BOB EVANS FARMS 
3 CAKE CHEESECAKE FACTORY INC 
4 CBRL CBRL GROUP INC 
5 CHUX O CHARLEYS INC 
6 ELMS ELMERS RESTAURANTS INC 
7 ELXS ELXSI CORP 
8 JAX J ALEXANDER CORP 
9 LNY LANDRYS RESTAURANTS INC 
10 LUB LUBYS INC 
11 MHG MERITAGE HOSPITALITY GROUP 
12 MR MORGANS FOODS INC 
13 PICZQ PICCADILLY CAFETERIAS INC 
14 QDIN QUALITY DINING INC 
15 SALD FRESH CHOICE INC 
16 SNS STEAK N SHAKE CO 
17 STAR LONE STAR STEAKHOUSE SALOON 
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